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Revisiting Sovereign Ratings, Capital Flows 
and Financial Contagion in Emerging Markets 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study revisits sovereign credit ratings, contagion and capital flows to Emerging 
Markets (EMs), and clarify the relationship between them. Specifically, this study 
analyzes how the changes in sovereign rating influence different types of capital flows to 
EMs and whether the changes in the different kinds of capital flows in one country be 
explained by a sovereign ratings’ change in another country. Using Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM for 23 EMs over the period 1990-
2012 the results of the study suggest that sovereign ratings is a crucial factor for EMs’ 
access to international capital markets and that capital flows is a major source of 
financing for Ems. In addition, the results show that financial contagion may continue to 
be a threat to capital flowing into EMs and that financial crisis increases the impact of 
sovereign rating on foreign direct investment but is not the case with portfolio 
investment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the early 1990s, emerging markets (EMs) witnessed an unprecedented surge in private 
capital flows in both portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI). Portfolio flows 
jumped from an average of about US$6 billion annually in the period 1982-88, to almost 
US$34 billion in 1992, with Latin American countries receiving the bulk of this increase 
(World Bank 1993). Additionally, the world’s FDI soared from US$192 billion in 1988 
to US$610 billion in 1998, with EMs receiving almost one quarter of total FDI (World 
Bank 2000).   
This phenomenon has been attributed to several factors including low investment 
prospects in developed countries, and low U.S. interest rates, which caused investments 
in EMs to be more attractive, the studies of Fernandez-Arias (1996) and Montiel and 
Reinhart (1999) are a good reference in this respect. However, a different line of thought 
emphasizes the role played by credit rating agencies (CRAs) in EM lending. CRAs 
provide information about a country's creditworthiness in terms of its economic stance, 
and its probability of default. The information collected on a sovereign government's 
willingness and ability to pay its debt in full, and in a timely manner, is known as a 
sovereign rating. Several studies identified the most important factors that determine 
sovereign ratings [See for example Cantor and Packer (1996) and Juttner and McCarthy 
(1998)].  
Ratings are most important for economies whose access to international capital 
markets varies greatly, as in the case for EMs. Due to information asymmetries prevalent 
in EMs, international investors were previously deterred from investing in unrated 
countries. However, realizing that foreign investment was likely to increase once EMs 
were rated, the number of rated countries increased from 12 in 1980 to around 100 in 
2002 (Carlson and Hale 2005). Ratings have thus increased sovereign governments’ 
access to international capital markets and enhanced their ability to raise funds at lower 
cost.  
CRAs came under severe scrutiny, however, following repeated defaults in the 
1990s and the occurrence of crises such as the Tequila crisis (1994/95), the Asian flu 
(1997/1998) and the Russian virus in 1998. The instability caused by these crises resulted 
in enormous capital outflows and to "sudden stops" in severe circumstances (Calvo 
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1998). The failure of CRAs to predict these crises, and their downgrading of sovereign 
ratings after the fact, led to the belief that they may have actually aggravated the crises. 
Given the nature of sovereign ratings as a stimulant to EMs' access to 
international capital markets, and the fact that they influence international investment 
decisions, capital flows have a tendency to respond to rating changes. There is also a 
possibility that this response is contagious and can spread across countries in crisis 
periods. This spread might happen even though ratings changes in other countries may 
have not occurred.  
However, only a few studies have attempted to empirically analyze the 
relationship between sovereign ratings, capital flows, and contagion.  Also, only a 
handful of studies attempted to investigate whether changes in sovereign ratings affected 
the types of capital flows differently. Such differences are probable given that capital 
flows vary in nature. Hence, breaking up the different types of capital flows permits the 
investigation of how capital flows respond to changes in sovereign ratings in different 
ways. Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993), as well as Taylor and Sarnor (1997) were 
among the pioneering studies in this area. Moreover, previous research did not investigate 
whether changes in ratings affect capital flows uniformly across countries, as compared 
to their effect in the ground zero country.1  
Thus, the purpose of this study is to revisit sovereign credit ratings, contagion and 
capital flows to EMs, and clarify the relationship between them. Specifically, this study 
will attempt to answer the following questions: how do rating changes influence different 
types of capital flows to EMs? Can changes in the different kinds of capital flows in one 
country be explained by a sovereign ratings’ change in another country?  
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature review. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the model specification and methodology. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes this study. Finally, the 
references appear at this study’s conclusion.  
 
 
                                                
1 The ground zero country is the country that was first downgraded. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
It should be noted that there is a vast amount of literature on sovereign ratings, capital 
flows, and contagion. However, the literature that combines those three strands is not as 
vast. The literature on the importance of sovereign ratings and their role in financial 
markets appeared after the 1994 Mexican crisis. Cantor and Packer (1996) found that 
CRAs supply information about speculative grade2 sovereigns more than that present in 
public information.   Reinhart (2002) and Kraussl (2003) asserted that sovereign credit 
ratings are principally central for EMs. This is because the accessibility of EMs to 
international capital markets is unstable, and varies strongly over time.  
The literature on the determinants of capital flows divides the determinants into 
push (external) factors, and pull (country specific) factors. Fernandez-Arias and Montiel 
(1995) found that international interest rates were a major determinant of the size of 
capital inflows to developing countries. Fernandez-Arias (1996) concluded that the rate 
of return in developed countries is also an important push factor. Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996) and Chuhan et al. (1998), found that the GDP growth rate of the developed 
countries is also a major push factor.  Regarding the pull factors, Fernandez-Arias and 
Montiel (1995) constructed a creditworthiness index and inferred that creditworthiness 
was a major determinant of the direction of capital flows.3  
As for contagion, there is a comprehensive theoretical and empirical literature on 
the international spreading of shocks. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1997) examined 
quarterly macro and political data on 20 OECD countries, and found that trade links are 
the principal transmission channel through which financial crises spread across countries. 
Glick and Rose (1998) used panel data of 161 countries and reached the same conclusion.  
We now move on to review the literature that most commonly combines sovereign 
ratings, capital flows and financial contagion. The first study was by Chuhan, Claessens, 
and Mamingi (1993) which used panel data for the period 1988-1992 on U.S. capital 
flows to nine Latin American countries and nine Asian countries. They found that bond 
flows were quicker to respond to a country's credit rating than equity flows.  
                                                
2 Defined as "non-investment-grade" in Cantor and Packer (1996): Speculative grade sovereigns are countries that have 
a higher risk of default. A guaranteed investment, or at least an investment with a high probability of return, is better 
allocated in country with ratings in the investment grade band.  
3 However, their credit worthiness index did not include sovereign ratings as a proxy for creditworthiness. 
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Calvo and Reinhart (1996) studied proof of contagion in Asia and Latin America 
prior to and post the December 1994 Mexican crisis. They also studied proof of “large 
neighbor effects” in capital flows to and from Latin America from 1970-1993. Several 
results were found: primarily, the degree of comovement across equity and bond returns 
in Latin America increased with the outbreak of the Mexican crisis.  
As an extension to Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993), Taylor and Sarno 
(1997) analyzed the determinants of U.S. capital flows to nine Latin American and nine 
Asian countries from 1988- 1992. They found that long term equity and bond flows are 
evenly sensitive to the push and pull factors employed, and that a country's domestic 
credit rating assisted in explaining the pattern of U.S. portfolio flows to the countries 
under study. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) concluded that in addition to significantly 
affecting bond and stock markets, changes in ratings resulted in contagion, or spillover, 
effects.  Kraussl (2003) found that changes in sovereign ratings of the ground-zero 
country significantly affected financial markets of other emerging markets.  
Albuquerque (2003), on the other hand, regressed the share of FDI in gross capital flows 
on the ratings assigned. He found an inverse relationship between them, and concluded 
that changes in FDI flows maybe explained by the change in ratings.  
III. DATA 
 
The data set is constructed as a panel of country observations from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank’s database of 2015. The data set includes 23 
EMs over the period 1990-2012. The list of countries included in the sample is reported 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 –List of EMs included in the Sample 
1 Argentina  13 Malaysia 
2 Brazil  14 Mexico 
3 Chile 15 Peru 
4 China 16 Philippines   
5 Columbia 17 Poland 
6 Czech Republic 18 Russia 
7 Egypt 19 Singapore 
8 Hong Kong 20 South Africa 
9 Hungary 21 Thailand 
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10 India  22 Turkey 
11 Indonesia 23 Venezuela  
12 Korea, Rep.   
 
The dependent variable consists of the two different types of capital flows: FDI 
(as a share of GDP) and foreign portfolio investment (as a share of GDP). The set of 
independent variables consist of the current account balance as a share of GDP, the real 
interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings, 
the weighted average of the G-74 real GDP growth rate, and the weighted average of the 
G-7 real interest rate.  
The data on the sovereign debt rating is collected from the Moody’s sovereign 
debt ratings5  which indicate the capacity and willingness of a government to repay back 
its obligations in full and on time. The Moody’s rating, that relates to foreign currency, 
focus on measuring the expected credit loss, which depends on the probability of default 
and the expected recovery rate after the default has occurred6. More specifically, the 
sovereign debt rating for a given government is defined as the risk facing an investor who 
holds debt securities issued by that government which in turn reflects its credit 
worthiness. 
 
IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION & METHODOLOGY 
The methodology can be divided into two parts. First, we shall examine the impact of a 
ratings change on different types of capital flows, and then investigate whether or not this 
impact displays a contagion effect. 
 
Table 2 Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name Definition Unit of Measurement Data Source 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
This series shows net inflows (new investment 
inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting 
economy from foreign investors, and is divided 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
                                                
4 France, Canada, Italy, Germany, U.S., U.K. and Japan. 
5Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, Aa, A1, A2, A3, A, ,Baa1, Baa2, Baa3,Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, B3,Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, C.  For detailed 
definition on each rating classification check Rowland (2005). 
6 )1).(( ee rdL −= ρ , where eL  is the expected loss, )(dρ is the probability of default, and er  is the expected   
   recovery rate as noted in Bhatia (2002). 
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by GDP.  
Portfolio 
investment, 
bonds (% of 
current US$) 
Bonds are securities issued with a fixed rate of 
interest for a period of more than one year. They 
include net flows through cross-border public 
and publicly guaranteed and private 
nonguaranteed bond issues. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars 
 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
Sovereign debt 
rating 
 
Ratings assigned by Standard & Poors (S&P) 
Aaa=23, 
Aa1=22…..,C=1 
S&P 500 Index 
(2013) 
 
Inflation 
 
The percentage change in consumer price index 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate 
adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
Current 
Account 
Balance (% of 
GDP) 
Current account balance is the sum of net 
exports of goods and services, net primary 
income, and net secondary income. 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
Growth of real 
per capita GDP 
Change in the log of real GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$). (Authors computation) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
G-7 real GDP 
growth rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real 
GDP per capita for the G-7 countries. (Authors 
computation) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
G-7 real 
interest rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real 
GDP per capita for the G-7 countries. (Authors 
computation) 
 
Percent 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(2015). 
Thus, for examining the impact of a ratings change on different types of capital flows, we 
form the subsequent dynamic panel regression model: 
itΚΙ =  +−1itKIρ 1−Χ tiβ + 11 −− +Ζ titi Rλδ itε+   (1) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 1990,…T 
Where KIit denotes the ratio of capital flows, of a certain type, to GDP, of country i, at 
time t. This ratio is taken rather than the absolute figure of capital flows to control for 
country size. KIit-1 is the lagged endogenous variable, while Xit-1 and Zit-1 are vectors of 
pull and push factors, respectively. Rit-1 represents the sovereign rating change of country 
i at time t-1. Finally, εit is the error term.  
+α
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To account for causality, one-period lagged values of the pull factors, and the 
sovereign ratings, will be included so that they become predetermined within the model.7 
Similar to Gande and Parsley (2003) a ratings change will comprise any amendments in 
sovereign ratings, and credit outlooks.8  
For the endogenous variables, KI, we shall disaggregate the capital flows, and 
study the determinants of the main constituents of the financial account: FDI (as a share 
of GDP), foreign portfolio investment, (as a share of GDP), and short term flows (as a 
share of GDP).  
As for the exogenous variables, we shall divide them into two groups: push 
factors and pull factors. The push factors encompass the weighted average of the G-7 real 
GDP growth rate, and the weighted average of the G-7 real interest rate. The vector of 
pull factors will include the current account balance as a share of GDP, the real interest 
rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, the degree of openness (calculated as the ratio 
of exports and imports to GDP), and Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings.  
Sovereign rating changes made by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) are the only ratings 
employed in this study. Li (2004) and Gande and Parsley (2004b) were among the studies 
that maintained S&P as the principal rating agency, and is a reflection of the ratings 
assigned by the other agencies in the market. The time period covered will be from 1990 
until 2012. The hypothesis that will be tested here is that sovereign ratings significantly 
affect the different types of capital flows. That is, a ratings downgrade/upgrade for 
country i will affect different types of capital flow in country i.  
Equation (1) will be estimated using the General Method of Moments estimator 
(GMM). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
estimators, if used, will result in biased estimators, and in inconsistent estimators (Hsiao 
(2003)) respectively. More specifically, the presence of a lagged endogenous variable 
suggests that correlation will exist between the latter and the error term, resulting in 
biased estimators. The GMM, however, will evade correlation problems (Yaffee (2003)), 
and will consistently estimate the dynamic panel data model (Kitazawa (2003)). 
 
                                                
7 Causality problems may arise, as pointed out by Kang et. al. (2003) because some pull factors might be influenced by capital flows.  
8Credit outlooks are included  since, usually, sovereign states are put on what is known as a ‘credit watch” that can be positive or 
negative several months prior to an actual upgrade or downgrade which can have an effect on the flow of capital. It should be noted 
that it is not at all necessary that a country placed on a credit watch to have its rating adjusted.  
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Following Caselli, Equivel and Lefort (1996), Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) 
and Arellano and Bond (1991), the capital flows model is estimated using dynamic panel 
System GMM. Equation (1) provides the general form of the empirical model. 
 
The System GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer(2000) overcomes the bias problems of the 
difference GMM estimator. It works by basically stacking together Equation (1) with 
Equation (2) below: 
(ΚΙit −ΚΙit−1 )=  ρ(KIit−1 −KIit−2 )+ β(Χ it−1 −Χ it−2 )+     
                                                               +γ (Rit−1 − Rit−2 )+ (εit −εit−1).           (2) 
The main reason for differencing Equation (1) is to eliminate the country specific or 
unobserved effects following Arellano and Bond (1991). In addition to the assumptions 
of the Difference GMM9, the System GMM assumes that the first difference of the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the country 
specific effects which provides the following two extra moments conditions about the 
correlation between the dependent variable and the error term and the set of the 
independent variables and the error term, 
 
E[ΔKi,tεi,t ]= 0,  For t = 2,…T 
E[ΔMi,tεi,t ]= 0,  For t = 2,…T  ,                                                            (3) 
where Mi,t is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1) except the push 
factors, Zi. In order to satisfy these additional moments conditions, the correct set of 
instruments was chosen by regressing the dependent variable and each of the explanatory 
variables in levels, each variable in a turn, on all the possible lags of the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables in first difference starting from the second lag in 
addition to time dummies. The instruments were chosen in such a way that a unique set 
of instrument for Ki,t−1  andMi,t−1  can be found. This set of instruments usually consists of 
the second lag of yi,t  andMi,t plus any other extra instruments that appear to be also 
significant.   
                                                
9 More details on Difference GMM are available in Traub (2006). 
+α
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For the set of instruments to be valid, it has to be both relevant and exogenous to the 
error term. The relevance test checks and makes sure that the first stage F-statistic equals 
or exceeds 10 or in other words that the bias of the Two Stage Least Squares is at most 
10% of the bias of the Ordinary Least Squares methodology10. The exogeneity test or 
“Over Identification Test”, or as know by Sargan test (Sargan 1988), tests that the 
moments conditions of Equation (3) above are satisfied.  
As for testing for contagion effects among capital flows, we follow Hernandez, Mellado, 
and Valdes (2001), and focus on the likelihood of the presence of “pure” contagion.  This 
entails a considerable co-movement in capital flows when changes in the determinants of 
capital flows are controlled for. 
By employing a dynamic panel regression model, the response of capital flows of 
EM country i to changes in the sovereign rating of EM country j will be measured. The 
following dynamic panel regression model is formed;  
= +   (4) 
The dependent variables are the same as before, as well as the vectors of push and pull 
factors. However, the explanatory variables in this equation contain ∑ Rjt which 
represents the sum of the changes in ratings elsewhere (i≠ j).11 ∑ Rjt is a weighted average 
of the BRICS countries’ rating controlled for country size.12  
Equation (3) will also be estimated using the GMM, and the hypothesis that will 
be tested here is that sovereign ratings changes in other countries (j≠i) significantly affect 
the different types of capital flows in country i. That is, a rating downgrade (upgrade) in 
country j will cause the different types of capital to flow out of (into) country i. 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
To avoid the endogeneity problem that might arise from causality –from capital inflows 
to one or more of the determinants and vice versa- leading to a possible correlation 
between the set of regressors and the residual term of the regression, the Arellano-Bond 
estimation methodology is used. Also the presence of lagged capital flows variable 
                                                
10 The book of Stock, J., Watson, M., (2006) provides good explanation on the TSLS. 
11 Note that country j may be referred to as the ground zero country in this case. 
12 This occurs by multiplying the value of country j’s regional discrete variable by its GDP, relative to the total GDP of the countries 
in the region. 
itΚΙ +α +−1itKIρ 1−Χ tiβ jt
N
j
ti R∑
=
+Ζ
1
σδ itε+
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suggest that an autocorrelation would be present between the latter and the error term. 
Furthermore, the time invariant country characteristics may be correlated with the set of 
regressors. 
The model is estimated under nine specifications of the independent variables. In 
each specification, the dependent variable is a type of capital flows; foreign direct 
investment as a percent of GDP or portfolio investment as a percent of GDP. The focus is 
on the partial correlations between the type of capital flows and the sovereign debt rating. 
 To estimate the model using Dynamic Panel System GMM, first the correct set of 
instruments must pass the instrument relevance test as well as the instrument exogeneity 
test. For the former test the F-statistic for the regressions in which each regressor is 
regressed on the whole set of instruments must exceed ten.  
For the instrument exogeneity test, or overidentification test, the hypothesis that the 
instruments are exogenous to the error term is tested. The hypothesis is rejected if the 
calculated J-statistic13 exceeds a chi-squared with m minus k restrictions at a chosen 
significant level, where m and k refer to the number of instruments and the number of 
endogenous regressors respectively. In addition, the Sargan p-value is calculated. 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating nine specifications for the FDI regression. 
Column 1 shows the results of the FDI regression with only an AR(1) term where the 
sign and significance of the lagged FDI is as expected. When the lagged GDP growth rate 
is added to the regression (Column 2 in Table 3), the coefficient of the lagged rating 
remains significant. The coefficient of GDP growth is also significant and the magnitude 
of this coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in GDP growth rate corresponds to 
about 0.499 percent increase in foreign direct investment. 
Next, adding lagged sovereign debt rating to the regression (Column 3 in Table 3), 
the coefficient of the lagged FDI remains significant. The coefficient of lagged rating 
shows a statistically significant positive coefficient implying that one classification 
increase in the sovereign rating corresponds to about 0.142 percent increase in FDI.  
When lagged inflation is added to the regression (Column 4 in Table 3), the coefficients 
of the lagged FDI, lagged GDP growth, and lagged rating do not change in terms of the 
signs and statistical significance. The coefficient of the lagged inflation rate, however,
                                                
13 Equal to the number of instruments multiplied by the second stage F-statistic. 
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shows an unexpectedly statistical insignificant impact on FDI. Similar results are 
obtained when adding the lagged interest rate (Column 5 in Table 3) and lagged current 
account as a percent of GDP (Column 6 in Table 3). 
Next, adding the weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate to the regression 
(Column 7 in Table 3), the coefficient imply a one percent increase in the G-7 weighted 
average GDP growth leads to 0.973 percent increase in FDI with all the previous results 
do not change in terms of sign and statistical significance. 
Furthermore, adding the second push factor to the regression (Column 8 in Table 3), 
the results suggest that the G-7 real interest rate has an expected negative influence on 
FDI in EMs, where a one percent increase in the real interest rate results in 0.209 drop in 
FDI in EMs. 
In the last specification (Column 9 in Table 3) the three insignificant coefficients are 
dropped and the model is re-estimated where the coefficients of lagged FDI, real GDP 
growth, sovereign rating, G-7 real growth rate, and G-7 real interest rate are statistically 
significant with expected signs. 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation (null hypothesis no autocorrelation) is 
applied to the differenced residuals. The test in first order is usually expected to reject the 
null. The test in second order is in levels and that is why more important in detecting 
autocorrelation. As the results of all specifications in Table 3 suggest no autocorrelation 
in levels between residuals. Finally, the results of Sargan test (null hypothesis instruments 
as a group are exogenous) suggest that the set of instruments used in all regressions are 
valid. 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating nine specifications for the portfolio 
investment regression. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the results of the portfolio investment 
regression with only an AR(1) term where the sign and significance of the lagged 
portfolio investment are as expected. When the lagged GDP growth rate is added to the 
regression (Column 2 in Table 4), the coefficient of the lagged rating remains significant. 
The coefficient of GDP growth is also significant and the magnitude of this coefficient 
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    Table 4 Portfolio Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 [1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] [7] [8] [9] 
Portfolio it-1 0.403*** 
(0.037) 
0.395*** 
(0.037) 
0.335*** 
(0.036) 
0.342*** 
(0.041) 
0.351*** 
(0.040) 
0.302*** 
(0.032) 
0.299*** 
(0.035) 
0.294*** 
(0.032) 
0.293*** 
(0.033) 
GDP Growth it  0.125*** 
(0.033) 
0.087*** 
(0.042) 
0.051 
(0.037) 
0.042 
(0.042) 
-0.020 
(0.038) 
-0.027 
(0.059) 
-0.035 
(0.062) 
 
Rating it   0.056*** 
(0.024) 
0.059** 
(0.027) 
0.059** 
(0.026) 
0.070*** 
(0.022) 
0.0.07*** 
(0.023) 
0.080*** 
(0.029) 
0.088*** 
(0.022) 
Inflation it    0.005 
(0.02) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
 
Real Interest Rate it     -0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
  
Current Account it      -0.087** 
(0.036) 
-0.088** 
(0.037) 
-0.093** 
(0.040) 
-0.598* 
(0.032) 
G-7 Growth it       0.031 
(0.138) 
0.120 
(0.187) 
 
G-7 Real Interest it        -0.092 
(0.077) 
 
Countries/Observations 17/336 17/330 17/315 17/297 16/271 16/271 16/271 16/271 23/435 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-1.897* 
[0.058] 
2.008 
[0.045] 
 
-1.843* 
[0.065] 
2.044 
[0.041] 
 
-1.891* 
[0.058] 
1.557 
[0.120] 
 
-1.759* 
[0.078] 
1.567 
[0.117] 
 
-1.746* 
[0.081] 
2.023 
[0.043] 
 
-1.805* 
[0.071] 
1.177 
[0.239] 
 
-1.799* 
[0.072] 
1.255 
[0.209] 
 
-1.802** 
[0.071] 
0.928 
[0.353] 
 
-1.933** 
[0.053] 
0.521 
[0.601] 
J-Statistic / Sargan P-
value 
4.31 
[0.97] 
15.35 
[0.34] 
14.55 
[0.41] 
15.40 
[0.42] 
12.97 
[0.67] 
10.39 
[0.92] 
10.48 
[0.92] 
9.58 
[0.94] 
9.58 
[0.94] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-values.
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indicates that a one percent increase in GDP growth rate corresponds to about 0.125 
percent increase in portfolio investment. 
Next, adding lagged sovereign debt rating to the regression (Column 3 in Table 4), 
the coefficient of the lagged portfolio investment remains significant. The coefficient of 
lagged rating shows a statistically significant positive coefficient implying that one 
classification increase in the sovereign rating corresponds to about 0.056 percent increase 
in portfolio investment as a share of GDP.  
Adding the lagged inflation to the regression (Column 4 in Table 4), the coefficients 
of the lagged portfolio investment and lagged rating do not change in terms of the signs 
and statistical significance. The coefficient lagged GDP growth, however, turned 
insignificant once the lagged inflation variable was added to the regression. Also, the 
lagged inflation rate shows an unexpectedly statistical insignificant impact on portfolio 
investment and similar results were obtained when adding the lagged interest rate 
(Column 5 in Table 4). Next, adding the lagged current account as a percent of GDP 
(Column 6 in Table 4) the results show a negative statistical significant impact on 
portfolio investment where a one percent increase in the current account leads to 0.87 
percent decrease in portfolio investment. 
In contrast to the results of FDI regressions, the push factors are not statistically 
significantly affecting portfolio investment. Both the weighted average of the G-7 real 
GDP growth rate to the regression (Column 7 in Table 4) and the G-7 real interest rate 
(Column 8) are not statistically significantly affecting portfolio investment in EMs. 
The last specification (Column 9 in Table 4) is run with the only three insignificant 
coefficients lagged FDI, sovereign rating, and current account as percent of GDP. The 
results show statistically significant coefficients with expected signs. 
Finally, the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation suggest a no second 
autocorrelation between residuals of all specifications and the Sargan test for 
overidentification suggest that the set of instruments used in all regressions are 
exogenous. 
To further investigate the impact of rating on capital flows, Tables 5 investigates the 
contagion effect of the BRICS countries on the inflow of FDI to the different countries of 
our sample excluding the BRICS countries. The variable BRICS Ratingit-1 is 
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Table 5 BRICS Contagion Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 [1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] [7] [8] [9] 
FDI it-1 0.707*** 
(0.032) 
0.695*** 
(0.027) 
0.637*** 
(0.018) 
0.632*** 
(0.022) 
0.631*** 
(0.027) 
0.631*** 
(0.030) 
0.646*** 
(0.041) 
0.651*** 
(0.043) 
0.650*** 
(0.028) 
GDP Growth it-1  0.499*** 
(0.218) 
0.440** 
(0.190) 
0.537** 
(0.224) 
0.588** 
(0.232) 
0.584*** 
(0.218) 
0.315* 
(0.164) 
0.3111** 
(0.165) 
0.249** 
(0.149) 
BRICS Rating it-1   0.106** 
(0.053) 
0.111* 
(0.060) 
0.102* 
(0.064) 
0.101** 
(0.043) 
0.080* 
(0.044) 
0.083* 
(0.043) 
0.091** 
(0.053) 
Inflation it-1     0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
 (0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
Real Interest Rate it-1     0.0226* 
(0.016) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.005 
(0.032) 
-0.0002 
(0.027) 
  
Current Account it-1      0.005 
(0.083) 
0.027 
(0.075) 
0.024 
(0.076) 
 
G-7 Growth it       1.138** 
(0.573) 
1.221* 
(0.665) 
1.030** 
(0.509) 
G-7 Real Interest it        -0.058 
(0.072) 
-0.046 
(0.074) 
Countries/Observation
s 
23/493 23/487 23/487 23/446 22/401 22/400 22/400 22/400 23/487 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-2.042** 
[0.041] 
-1.265 
[0.206] 
 
-2.157** 
[0.031] 
-1.244 
[0.214] 
 
-2.319** 
[0.020] 
-1.223 
[0.221] 
 
-2.245** 
[0.025] 
-1.225 
[0.220] 
 
-2.246** 
[0.025] 
-1.210 
[0.226] 
 
-2.253** 
[0.024] 
-1.212 
[0.225] 
 
-2.264** 
[0.024] 
-1.226 
[0.220] 
 
-2.250** 
[0.025] 
-1.227 
[0.220] 
 
-2.324** 
[0.020] 
-1.225 
[0.220] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
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computed as the average of the rating of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
As the results of Table 5 suggest, under all specification of the model, it can be noticed 
that the changes in the average rating of the BRICS countries exerts a positive significant 
impact on the other group of EMs in the sample.  
Similarly, Table 6 shows the impact of the variability in sovereign debt rating of 
BRICS as a region on the inflow of portfolio investment flows to other EMs included in 
our sample, excluding BRICS. The results suggest that BRICS has a positive statistically 
significant contagion effect on the other EMs in the sample. The coefficient of the 
variable BRICS Ratingit-1 is statistically significant and positive in all specifications. 
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Table 6 BRICS Portfolio Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 [1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] [7] [8] [9] 
Portfolio it-1 0.403*** 
(0.037) 
0.395*** 
(0.037) 
0.366*** 
(0.041) 
0.377*** 
(0.042) 
0.370*** 
(0.041) 
0.299*** 
(0.029) 
0.294*** 
(0.032) 
0.291*** 
(0.032) 
0.327*** 
(0.031) 
GDP Growth it  0.125*** 
(0.033) 
0.103*** 
(0.033) 
0.078** 
(0.035) 
0.092** 
(0.047) 
-0.027 
(0.037) 
-0.020 
(0.058) 
-0.019 
(0.057) 
 
BRICS Rating it   0.034*** 
(0.012) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.061*** 
(0.018) 
0.062*** 
(0.019) 
0.062*** 
(0.020) 
0.053*** 
(0.019) 
Inflation it    0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
 
Real Interest Rate it     -0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
  
Current Account it      -0.112*** 
(0.039) 
-0.113*** 
(0.042) 
-0.116*** 
(0.044) 
-0.080** 
(0.036) 
G-7 Growth it       0.068 
(0.143) 
0.094 
(0.173) 
 
G-7 Real Interest it        -0.026 
(0.055) 
 
Countries/Observations 17/336 17/330 17/330 17/312 16/279 16/279 16/279 16/279 17/336 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-1.897* 
[0.058] 
2.008 
[0.045] 
 
-1.843* 
[0.065] 
2.044 
[0.041] 
 
-1.828* 
[0.067] 
1.971 
[0.048] 
 
-1.719* 
[0.088] 
1.851 
[0.064] 
 
-1.711* 
[0.087] 
2.20 
[0.028] 
 
-1.786* 
[0.074] 
1.213 
[0.225] 
 
-1.780* 
[0.075] 
1.284 
[0.199] 
 
-1.770* 
[0.075] 
1.206 
[0.228] 
 
-1.914* 
[0.055] 
0.935 
[0.350] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
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 To add more depth to the analysis, we investigate this contagion effect per BRICS 
countries on the other countries included in the sample. In Table 7, five different 
regressions are performed where the impact of the sovereign debt rating of each of the 
five BRICS countries is included in a turn in the model in order to estimate its effect on 
the FDI of the group of EMs in our sample. For instance the first column shows the effect 
of the changes in Brazil’s sovereign debt rating on FDI of all the countries included in 
our sample with the exception of Brazil. As the results suggest, the changes in Brazil’s 
rating exerts a statistical significant impact on the FDI of EMs (with the exception of 
Brazil).  
 Table 7 BRICS Contagion Effect per Countries: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 Brazil 
 
(1) 
Russia 
 
(2) 
India 
 
(3) 
China 
 
(4) 
South 
Africa 
(5) 
FDI it-1 0.656*** 
(0.027) 
0.648*** 
(0.040) 
0.659*** 
(0.044) 
0.649*** 
(0.047) 
0.652*** 
(0.041) 
 
GDP Growth it 0.323* 
(0.182) 
0.322* 
(0.184) 
0.296* 
(0.161) 
0.306** 
(0.161) 
0.305* 
(0.178) 
 
Country Rating it-1 0.099* 
(0.055) 
0.098*** 
(0.031) 
0.095 
(0.062) 
0.082* 
(0.045) 
0.094*** 
(0.032) 
Inflation it-1  -0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
 (0.012) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
 
Real Interest Rate it-1 -0.004 
(0.363) 
-0.005 
(0.042) 
-0.002 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.007 
(0.037) 
  
Current Account it-1 0.023 
(0.089) 
0.021 
(0.101) 
0.036 
(0.077) 
0.029 
(0.079) 
0.021 
(0.085) 
 
G-7 Growth it 1.29* 
(0.667) 
1.30* 
(0.668) 
1.127* 
(0.657) 
1.228* 
(0.650) 
1.287* 
(0.696) 
 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.038 
(0.065) 
0.024 
(0.085) 
-0.124 
(0.061) 
-0.089 
(0.061) 
-0.0756 
(0.082) 
Countries/Observations 22/345 22/329 22/400 22/374 22/360 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-2.193** 
[0.028] 
-1.218 
[0.223] 
 
-2.162** 
[0.031] 
-1.225 
[0.220] 
 
-2.228** 
[0.026] 
-1.233 
[0.217] 
 
-2.239** 
[0.025] 
-1.217 
[0.223] 
 
-2.222** 
[0.026] 
-1.214 
[0.224] 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the  
                Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
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 It is important to note that given that the objective of this part of the study is to 
analyze the contagion effect of each of the BRICS countries on the rest of the countries in 
the sample, the sub i index attached to all the regressors of Table 7 refers to all countries 
in the sample with the exception of the country for which the regression is run. For 
instance in Column 2 of Table 7, the rating of Russia is included in the model but Russia 
itself is excluded from the sample. The same goes for the other four regressions. The 
results of Column 2 show that variability in ratings in Russia has a positive statistically 
significant impact of FDI of the other countries in the sample. 
 The table also shows that the changes in sovereign debt rating in either China or 
South Africa leads to a positive statistically significant impact on FDI for the group of 
EMs in our sample. The results of Column 3 of Table 7 shows that variability in India’s 
rating does not exert a statistical significant impact on the EMs of our sample.  
Similarly, Table 8 shows five regressions performed where in each regression one of 
the BRICS countries’ rating is taken in a turn in order to estimate its impact on the 
portfolio investment of the group of EMs of our sample. As was the case in Table 7, given 
that we are measuring contagion effect, in each regression of Table 8 the sub I index under 
each regressor includes all the countries in the sample with the exception to the country 
for which the regression is run.
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    Table 8 BRICS Contagion Effect per Countries: Portfolio Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 Brazil 
 
(1) 
Russia 
 
(2) 
India 
 
(3) 
China 
 
(4) 
South 
Africa 
(5) 
Portfolio it-1 0.299*** 
(0.031) 
0.272*** 
(0.031) 
0.292*** 
(0.032) 
0.286*** 
(0.030) 
0.284*** 
(0.031) 
 
GDP Growth it 0.026 
(0.052) 
0.007 
(0.074) 
-0.055 
(0.063) 
-0.042 
(0.060) 
 
0.011 
(0.055) 
Rating it 0.070*** 
(0.026) 
0.051** 
(0.029) 
0.103*** 
(0.035) 
0.070*** 
(0.025) 
0.058*** 
(0.022) 
Inflation it 0.015 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
 
0.021 
(0.014) 
Real Interest Rate it -0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
 
-0.006 
(0.011)  
Current Account it -0.109*** 
(0.033) 
-0.104*** 
(0.035) 
-0.111** 
(0.046) 
-0.117** 
(0.047) 
-0.120*** 
(0.032) 
 
G-7 Growth it 0.109 
(0.199) 
0.115 
(0.222) 
0.143 
(0.189) 
0.121 
(0.185) 
 
0.052 
(0.169) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.038 
(0.068) 
0.013 
(0.055) 
-0.088 
(0.075) 
-0.061 
(0.069) 
-0.35 
(0.059) 
Countries/Observations 16/251 16/240 16/279 16/270 16/261 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-1.806* 
[0.071] 
0.041* 
[0.968] 
 
-1.844* 
[0.065] 
-0.252* 
[0.252] 
 
-1.767* 
[0.072] 
1.292 
[0.197] 
 
-1.783* 
[0.075] 
1.144 
[0.252] 
 
-1.848* 
[0.064] 
0.770 
[0.441]] 
J-Statistic / Sargan P-
value 
12.97 
[0.67] 
10.39 
[0.92] 
10.48 
[0.92] 
9.58 
[0.94] 
9.58 
[0.94] 
                  Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  levels respectively Numbers in round parentheses (.)     
                  are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
 
As the results of Table 8 suggest, the changes in the sovereign debt rating of Brazil 
has a positive statistical significant impact on the portfolio investment as a percentage of 
GDP of the group of other EMs included in the sample. The same result applies for 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa where variability of rating in each one of these 
countries exerts a statistically significant contagion effect on other EMs included in the 
sample.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to investigate the impact of rating on capital flows in the 
presence of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. To measure this effect, a dummy 
variable for the crisis is added to the model to imply the presence of the crisis along with 
an interaction term of this dummy with the rating regressor. The total effect of the 
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presence of the crisis is measured as the sum of the coefficient of the dummy variable and 
the coefficient of the interaction term. The standard error of this linear combination is 
calculated and used to compute the t-statistic of the total effect. 
The results of Tables 9 suggest that the dummy variable representing the crisis is 
statistically significant. Also, and more importantly, the total effect of rating in the 
presence of the crisis suggests that the effect of rating on FDI increases during the times 
of a crisis than times without. The total effect shows a positive and a statistically 
significant coefficient 
 
 
   Table 9 Global Financial Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 [1] [2] 
FDI it-1 0.628*** 
(0.058) 
0.620*** 
(0.066) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.290* 
(0.178) 
0.308** 
(0.195) 
Rating it-1 0.198*** 
(0.046) 
0.196*** 
(0.047) 
Inflation it-1  0.003 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Real Interest Rate it-1 -0.0004 
(0.034) 
-0.0005 
(0.033) 
Current Account it-1 0.032 
(0.072) 
0.025 
(0.067) 
G-7 Growth it 1.071** 
(0.597) 
1.047** 
(0.599) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.322** 
(0.166) 
-0.310** 
(0.170) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 -0.924 
(0.893) 
-2.817** 
(1.520) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1  0.148 
(0.157) 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
 0.345*** 
(0.119) 
Countries/Observations 22/366 22/366 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-2.203** 
[0.024] 
-1.219 
[0.228] 
 
-2.250** 
[0.024] 
-1.225 
[0.221] 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are 
the Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
 
Similarly, the impact of sovereign debt rating on portfolio investment in the presence 
of the financial crisis dummy is estimated in Table 10.  The results of Column 1 of Table 
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10 show that the crisis dummy is statistically insignificant. Also, adding the interaction 
term to the regression as shown in Column 2 of the same table shows that the total effect 
of rating in the presence of the crisis has no statistical significant impact on portfolio 
investment. 
 
    Table 10: Global Financial Crisis Effect: Portfolio Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 [1] [2] 
Portfolio it-1 0.294*** 
(0.031) 
0.295*** 
(0.029) 
GDP Growth it -0.032 
(0.058) 
-0.040 
(0.067) 
Rating it 0.090* 
(0.047) 
0.093** 
(0.051) 
Inflation it 0.021 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
Real Interest Rate it -0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Current Account it -0.090** 
(0.037) 
-0.093** 
(0.040) 
G-7 Growth it 0.095 
(0.152) 
0.120 
(0.187) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.110 
(0.101) 
-0.092 
(0.077) 
 
Crisis Dummy t -0.141 
(0.313) 
0.120 
(0.187) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it  -0.092 
(0.077) 
 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
 0.0628 
(.074) 
Countries/Observations 16/271 17/315 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1                                     
 
Order 2 
 
-1.799* 
[0.072] 
1.255 
[0.209] 
 
-1.802** 
[0.071] 
0.928 
[0.353] 
  Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   
 levels respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, 
 and numbers in square parentheses [.]are the Arellano-Bond Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
 
To sum up, estimating the impact of rating on portfolio investment in the presence 
of a crisis, our results suggest that neither the dummy nor the interaction term is 
significant. The combined effect, represented by the total effect, is also statistically 
insignificant. This result is an unexpected one and would consider further analysis. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The study analyzes how the changes in sovereign rating influence different types of 
capital flows to EMs and whether the changes in the different kinds of capital flows in 
one country be explained by a sovereign ratings’ change in another country. The results 
of the study suggest that sovereign rating is a crucial factor for EMs’ access to 
international capital markets. Sovereign rating has a statistically significant effect on 
either FDI (as a percent of GDP) or portfolio investment (as a percent of GDP). 
Additionally, the results suggest that capital flows are a major source of financing for 
EMs, however, financial contagion may continue to be a threat to capital flowing into 
EMs. The BRICS as either a group or individual countries exert a statistically significant 
contagion effect on EMs. Finally, the presence of a financial crisis increases the impact of 
sovereign rating on FDI but not the case with portfolio flows. 
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